"Disk-Television": Some Recurring Copyright
Problems in the Reproduction and
Performance of Motion Picturest
The art of recording and reproducing pictures in motion1 has been
expanded by a revolutionary new device which is now in an advanced
stage of development. The Columbia Broadcasting System has developed "a metal disk that reproduces motion pictures through a television
set in much the same manner as a long-playing record reproduces
music through a high fidelity phonograph ....,,2The social and economic implications of disk-television, a major advance over magnetic
tape, are almost limitless.3 Viewers, in the privacy of their homes,
t Boardman Lloyd, J.D. 1967, The University of Chicago Law School. This essay was
awarded First Prize in the 1966 Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition at the University
of Chicago Law School, and Fourth Prize in the National Competition. It is published
through the courtesy of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.-Ed.
1 A useful definition of motion pictures given in the proposed revision of the Copyright Act presently before Congress: "'Motion pictures' are audiovisual works consisting
of a series of related images which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of
motion, together with accompanying sounds, if any." "Audiovisual works" are defined as
"works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be
shown by the use of machines or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material
objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied." H.R. 2512, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 101 (1967).
2 N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 1, col. 6. See also Wall Street Journal, March 1, 1966,
p. 31, col. 3.
3 Disk-television avoids the major problems which have apparently blocked, or at least
slowed down, the successful development and marketing of subscription television. See
Comment, Aspects of Pay Television: Regulation, Constitutional Law, Antitrust, 53 CAIF.
L. RFv. 1378 (1965); N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 34, col. 6. The fact that subscription
television has lagged behind commercial broadcasting is "due in large part to technical
and economic considerations." Comment, supra, 53 CALF. L. REv. at 1381. Subscription
television is further limited by the regulatory powers of the Federal Communications
Commission. Fischer's Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 650, 655 (1936).
See also Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 279
(1933); Allen B. Dumont Laboratories v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153, 154-55 (3d Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 929 (1951). It has been suggested that closed circuit pay television will
also come under the jurisdiction of the FCC. See Comment, supra, 53 CALMF. L. REv. at
1386-91. Because there is no radio broadcast involved in the performance of disk-television,
it does not share with subscription television the technical, political, and economic
problems of radio wave transmission. Furthermore, unlike subscription television, the
viewer of disk-television may lease or buy a disk and watch it when he chooses.
Advocates of subscription television have pointed out that "free" television must,
because of the demands of its sponsor-advertiser, compromise the subject matter of its
programs in order to attract the largest possible number of viewers. See Kalven & Rosenfield, Minow Should Watch His Step in the Wasteland, Fortune, Oct., 1962, pp. 116, 148.

Disk-Television Copyrights

0

687

will have a variety in choice of motion pictures similar to that now
enjoyed in the selection of long-playing music records. The television
disks are of simple construction and could be sold or rented by super4
markets or other stores.
Although the development of disk-television promises significant
advantages to the average home television viewer, it simultaneously
crystallizes several difficult copyright problems which, for some time,
have plagued the motion picture industry. Under what circumstances
will the unauthorized manufacture5 or the unauthorized performance
of a motion picture constitute an infringement of the rights of the
holder of the movie's copyright? A more theoretical question, which
will also be considered here, is whether the unauthorized manufacture
or performance of a motion picture should ever constitute a copyright
infringement,7 and if so, under what circumstances?
I. THEaRIGHTS OF A MOTION PicruR COPYRIGHT OWNER TO
THE REPRODUCrTION AND PERFORMANCE OF His WORK
In White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.," the proprietor
of two duly copyrighted musical compositions sued to restrain the defendant manufacturer from making and selling perforated music rolls
(pianola rolls) which, when used with certain musical instruments also
manufactured by the defendant, reproduced "in sound the melody
recorded in the two pieces of music copyrighted by the appellant
[plaintiff]." 9 The question before the Supreme Court was whether the
perforated music rolls were "copies"' 1 of the appellant's musical comIn short, "free" television must appeal to the tastes of the majority. Subscription television,
on the other hand, would, as in the case of the book market, be able to diversify the
subject matter of its programs and thus reach the demand created by specific minority
interests which are not satisfied by "free" television. Thus, "if the problem is that the
current T.V. market does not work like the book market, the solution should be to make
it possible for T.V. to function more like a book market." Id. at 148. In this respect, disktelevision, because of the technical simplicity in the performance of the disks, and the
limitless area in which the disks can be marketed, provides a closer analogy to the book
market than does subscription television, and thus appears to be a more desirable system.
4 N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 34, col. 7.
5 "Unauthorized manufacture" means the manufacture of a copyrighted work without
the right to such manufacture derived either directly from the copyright law, or from a
license granted by the owner of the copyrighted work.
6 "Unauthorized performance" means the performance of a copyrighted work without
the right to such performance derived either directly from the copyright law, or from a
license granted by the owner of the copyrighted work.
7 A related issue is whether books and phonograph records should be treated the same
as motion pictures, or whether it is possible to make reasonable distinctions between these
different mediums. See note 68 infra.
8 209 U.S. 1 (1907).
9 Id. at 9.

10 Section l(a) of the Copyright Act states that "any person entitled thereto, upon
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positions; that is, whether the making of the rolls infringed the exclusive right to "copy" the musical compositions secured to the composer
or proprietor under the existing statutes.- The appellant contended
that although the perforated notation on the piano rolls was a different
type of notation than that used on sheet music, the music roll was
"none the less a 'musical composition,' none the less a perfect record,
and none the less a 'writing.' 1u2 However, the Court held that the
perforated music rolls were not "copies" of the musical compositions
under section 1 (a), nor, more specifically, of the sheet music on which
the musical compositions were written. The Court stated that the
"musical tones [recorded on the music rolls] are not a copy which
appeals to the eye .... Even those skilled in the making of these rolls
are unable to read them as musical compositions, as those in staff
notation are read by the performer."' 3 The music rolls "are not intended to be read as an ordinary piece of sheet music."1 4 Finally, the
perforated music rolls were essentially "parts of a machine" and therefore distinguishable from a "copy" within the meaning of the Copyright Act.15
It is not clear, under the doctrine of the Apollo case, whether a disk
would constitute a "copy" of a motion picture film from which it was
made. An arguable distinction can be made between the "music rollsheet music," and the "disk-motion picture film" groupings. Sheet
music can be read from and is used for that purpose by musicians, and,
in Apollo, this was held not to be true of music rolls made from the
sheet music.
The "can't read it" distinction used in the Apollo case is less applicable to the latter grouping. Neither disks nor motion picture films
are "read" in the way that sheet music is read by musicians. Further,
disks and motion picture films are similar to the extent that both are
merely "part of a machine." That a disk might be held a copy of the
motion picture film from which it was made gains support from
Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co.' In that case, an action was
brought to restrain the Royal Music Company from copying and duplicating perforated music rolls manufactured by the complainant. In
granting relief to the complainant the Court held that the making of
complying 'with the provisions of this title, shall have the exclusive right: (a) to print,
reprint, publish, copy, and vend copyrighted work ...." 17 U.S.C. § 1(a) (1964).
11 For further discussion on this issue, see Meagher, Copyright Problems Presented by a
New Art, 30 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 1081, 1091 (1955).
12 White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 4 (1907).
13 Id. at 17-18.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 196 Fed. 926 (W.D. N.Y. 1912).
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music rolls from previously made music rolls was an infringement of
section l(a) of the Copyright Act. The Court's opinion emphasized
that Congress intended to protect copyright owners in their right to
their productions, and that the respondent could not "avail himself of
the skill and labor of the original manufacturer of the perforated roll
or record by copying or duplicating the same ... ."17 The reasoning of
the Apollo and Aeolian cases arguably suggests that although a disk
has a different form from that of a motion picture film, the disk is
part of a machine and, essentially, a copy or duplication of the skill and
labor incorporated in the motion picture film, and therefore a "copy"
within the meaning of the Copyright Act.
However, other language of the Apollo decision suggests that a disk
would not constitute a "copy" of a motion picture film under section
l(a). The Court in Apollo adopted a narrow definition of "copy" requiring that the copying be apparent to the eye. The majority cited
with approval the definition of copy proposed in the early English case
of West v. Francis.8 In that case, the plaintiff was the proprietor of
seven prints from which the defendant made five hundred copies. The
English court, while holding the defendant liable to an action by the
proprietor of the original prints, stated that "a copy is that which comes
so close to the original as to give to every person seeing it the idea
created by the original."' 9 Under such a limited definition it would
probably be held that a disk is not a copy of a motion picture film since
the content of the motion picture can not be "seen" by merely looking
at the disk. The Court also stated that "the [copyright] statute has not
provided for the protection of the intellectual conception apart from
the thing produced ..
-.
";20
and although it may be true in the Apollo
case that the use of the perforated rolls enabled the respondent manufacturers to "enjoy the use of musical compositions for which they pay
no value. . . " such considerations "properly address themselves to the
legislative and not to the judicial branch of the Government." 21 Accordingly, it is arguable that section l(a) protects the proprietor of a
motion picture film only to the extent of the "thing"-i.e., the motion
picture film-itself, and that, therefore, the manufacture of a disk,
though made from a motion picture film would not appear to be an
infringement under section 1(a).
Although the disk is not a "copy" of a motion picture film or videotape within the present meaning of the Copyright Act, the unauthorized
17 Id. at 927.

18 5 B & Ald. 737 (1822).
19 Id. at 743.
20 White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1907).
21 Id. at 18.
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performance of a disk on a television screen might be considered an
infringement. Rights to the performance of motion pictures were given
limited protection in the district court case of Tiffany Productions,
Inc. v. Dewing.2 2 In that case it was assumed, but not held, that the
performance of motion pictures was neither a "publication" nor a
"copy" within the meaning of section l(a). The court held, however,
that the unauthorized exhibition of motion picture "photoplays" infringed the exclusive rights secured for "dramatic works" under section
l(d),23 which protects the right to exhibit, perform, represent, produce
or reproduce it in any manner or by any method whatsoever.2 4 The
court did not extend its holding to "motion-pictures other than photoplays" 25 since they could not be considered "dramatic works." The
holding is further limited by the conditions of section l(d) which
gives copyright protection to the performance of a "dramatic work"
'26
only when such performance is "public.
The subsequent district court decision of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Distributing Corp. v. Bijou Theater Co.2 7 significantly expanded the
Tiffany holding. Although the court did not unhesitatingly accept the
conclusion that motion picture photoplay films are dramatic works
and thereby protected under section l(d), it did state that "motionpicture photoplays are either dramatic works entitled to protection
under subdivision (d) of section 1 [performance of a dramatic work]
. . . whose unauthorized performance is an infringement of the
performing rights given to dramatic works, or they are nondramatic
works entitled to protection under subdivision (b) [dramatization of a
nondramatic work]."' 28 Under either section there would be no protection for a motion picture which did not meet the minimum plot
requirements of a "dramatic"composition. 29
22 50 F.2d 911 (D. Md. 1931).
23 Section l(d) of the Copyright Act provides that "any person entitled thereto, upon
complying with the provisions of this title, shall have the exclusive right . . . (d) To
perform or represent the copyrighted work publicly if it be a drama .... " 17 U.S.C. § l(d)
(1964).
24 "[IThe court in thus bringing a motion picture photoplay within the 'dramatic
works' to which section l(d) applies, found no contrary significance in the existence of
separate classifications for dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions and for motionpicture photoplays in section 5." Meagher, supra note 11, at 1095.
25 17 U.S.C. § 5(m) (1964). This section provides for the registration of motion pictures
other than photoplays. See NiMMER, COPYRIGHT § 25.1 (1966).
26 See note 23 supra. See also NiMMEm, COPYRiGHT § 107.2 (1966).
27 8 F. Supp. 66 (D. Mass. 1933).
28 Id. at 73. Section l(b) of the Copyright Act states that "any person entitled thereto,
upon complying with the provisions of this title, shall have the exclusive right ...
(b) to . . . make any version thereof, if it be a literary work; to characterize it if it be a
non dramatic work...." 17 U.S.C. § l(b) (1964).
29 For varying definitions of "dramatic work," see Seltzer v. Sunbrock, 22 F. Supp. 621
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According to the Tiffany and Bijou cases, the exhibition rights of a
motion picture copyright owner are strictly limited to motion picture
photoplays. However, these rights were given unrestricted scope by the
unprecedented decision of the Second Circuit in Pattersonv. Century
Productions,Inc., 0 in which the concept of "copy" under section 1(a)
was stretched to include the projection of a motion picture onto a
screen. In that case, the complainant, Patterson, had filmed 15,000
feet of wild animal scenes, 6,000 feet of which he selected and arranged into a motion picture, and had copyrighted under section 5(m)
of the Copyright Act as a motion picture "other than a photoplay."
In some unauthorized way (not indicated in the opinion), the defendant film company came into possesion of the positive copies which
the complainant had made from his motion picture, and was thereby
able to incorporate 1,000 to 1,500 feet of the complainant's work into
a motion picture produced by the defendant which was later exhibited
in public and for profit. The court said that:
[W]hen the film was shown the defendants who did that made
an enlarged copy of the picture. It was to be sure temporary
but still a copy while it lasted. I suppose a painting reproduced in colors that quickly faded to leave the canvas blank
would, when the reproduction was complete, be a copy re-

31
gardless of its life as such.

By thus giving protection under section l(a) rather than under section
l(d), or even l(b), the court effectively bypassed the "public performance" and "dramatic" limitations imposed by the latter sections.
Under this expansive construction of section l(a), any unauthorized
performance, public or private, for profit or not for profit, of any copyrighted motion picture would appear to be an infringement.
The Patterson decision was, however, narrowly interpreted by the
recent district court case of Mura v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc.32 The action in that case was brought by the owner of copyrights

covering certain hand puppets which were allegedly displayed by the
defendant, Columbia Broadcasting System, on its "Captain Kangaroo
Show." The court held that the evanescent reproduction of a hand
puppet on a television screen or on a projected kinescope recording
was "so different in nature from the copyrighted hand puppet"3 3 that
(S.D. Cal. 1938); Daly v. Palmer, 6 Fed. Cas. 1132 (No. 3552) (S.D.N.Y. 1868); O'Neill v.
General Film Co., 152 N.Y. Supp. 599 (Sup. Ct. 1915), modified, 171 App. Div. 854, 157
N.Y. Supp. 1028 (1916).
30 93 F. 2d 489 (2d Cir. 1937).
31 Id. at 493.
32 147 U.S.P.Q. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
33 Id. at 40.
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there was no "copying" within the meaning of section 1(a). In so holding, the decision impliedly distinguished the Pattersoncase on its facts.
The court cited Pattersonfor the proposition that "it is obvious that a
copyright of a work of art may be infringed by reproduction of the
object itself,"34 thereby implying that in Patterson the image on the
movie screen was a copy because the image was an actual reproduction
of the images in each frame of the copyrighted motion picture film,
while holding that "the puppets were not reproduced" by the temporary, evanescent image of the puppets on a television screen. 35
Although the holding of the Mura case carries little precedential
weight, the opinion does reveal the confusion in the law as to the meaning of "copy" under section l(a). With respect to disk-television, it
might be argued, consistent with the logic of the Mura case, that the performance of a disk on a television screen would not be a "copy" of a disk,
or a videotape recording, whereas under the Patterson doctrine a performance, in the case where the disk was made from a motion picture
film, might be found to be a "copy" of that motion picture. Such reasoning might also suggest that the exhibition of a videotape recording
on a television screen would not be a "copy" of the videotape under section 1(a) because the images on the screen would not actually reproduce
the videotape, as it would the individual frames in a motion picture
film.
The fine distinctions suggested by the case law between the different
types of motion picture devices, e.g., motion picture films and videotape,
seem to be less a result of the policy underlying copyright protection
than of outdated concepts which did not anticipate the extensive development of motion pictures films, television, and disk-television. The
question then arises as to whether these distinctions should exist. For
the purposes of the copyright law, no logical distinction can be made
between the different types of motion picture devices. All are simply
mechanical methods of creating pictures in motion. Where, for example, a disk is produced by using a motion picture film, the disk
should be considered a copy of the original motion picture. This would
provide the motion picture copyright owner with a source of control
over the production of his work through leasing or contract arrangements, and with a remedy against unauthorized reproduction of his
work under section 1(a). Furthermore, in order to avoid the spurious
distinctions which classify the image on a screen a "copy" of one device
but not of another, the law should either expand its definition of "copy"
under section l(a) to include the performance of motion pictures, or
Ibid.
35 Ibid.
34
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include in the Copyright Act explicit recognition of the exclusive
right of a motion picture copyright owner to the performance of his
motion picture.
The proposition that the owner of a motion picture copyright
should have an exclusive right to the performance of his motion picture
has, however, come under some attack.36 The debate centers mainly
on whether the owner of a motion picture copyright should have the
exclusive right to all exhibitions without qualification, or whether such
a right should be limited to public performances or to performances
made for profit.
37

The "For Profit" Limitation

Under the Copyright Act, an unauthorized public performance of a
"musical composition" or of a "nondramatic literary work" will infringe the rights of the owner only if such performance is made for
profit.38 In contrast, the "unauthorized public performance of a dra-

matic work infringes regardless of whether or not it is for profit."3 9
The "for profit" limitation first appeared in the copyright reform of
1909.40 The final report on the bill 4 ' gave the following justification
for not imposing a profit limitation on the performance of dramatic
works:
It is usual for the author of a dramatic work to refrain from
reproducing copies of the work for sale. He does not usually
publish his work in the ordinary acceptance of the term, and
hence in such cases never receives any royalties on copies
sold ....

If an author desires to keep his dramatic work in

unpublished form and give public representations thereof
only, this right should be fully secured to him by law. We
have endeavored to so frame this paragraph as to amply
42
secure him these rights.
An extension of this argument focuses more directly on the protection
36 See generally VARMER FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS,
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,

86TH CONG., 2D SESS.,

STUDY No.

16: LIMITATIONS

ON

PERFORMING RIGHTS 81, 125-35 (Comm. Print 1958).
37 "In order to constitute a performance 'for profit' it is not necessary that a direct pay-

ment be made, as an admission charge or otherwise, for the performance. A performance
will be 'for profit' if it occurs with an expectation by the person causing such a performance of direct or indirect commercial advantage or gain to be derived therefrom." NIMMER,
COPYRIGHT § 107.32, at 403 (1966).
38 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(c), (e) (1964).
39 17 U.S.C. § I(d) (1964).
40 VARMER, op. cit. supra note 86, at 81-82.
41 H.R. REP. No. 222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909).
42 Id. at 4.
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of the copyright owner's right to the commercial exploitation of his
work. 43 "If a dramatic work is performed, even on a nonprofit basis,
those who view such performance are not likely thereafter to attend
a performance for profit of the same work."4 4 The theory is that any
performance of a dramatic work "in some degree diminishes the potential revenue to be obtained from performances for profit." 45 Such
considerations support the argument that the rights to the performance
of motion pictures should not be limited to performances for profit.
The performance of a motion picture, like that of a dramatic work,
is normally seen only once. In fact, it would seem that the argument
against a "for profit" limitation is more applicable to motion pictures
than to dramatic works. With respect to dramatic works, it might be
argued that although one has attended a nonprofit performance he
still might pay to see the work a second time; for example, when the
cast was superior to that of the first performance. In the case of the
motion picture, however, every performance is identical.The argument in favor of the "for profit" limitation has centered
around the public interest in certain civic, educational, and religious
activities.40 Such an objective, however, could be realized easily through
specific statutory language; this would preserve the rights of the copyright owner to the private or unauthorized performance of his motion
picture.
The "Public" Limitation

All the performance rights which are granted under the Copyright
Act are limited to those performances which are public. 47 The "public"
43 NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 107.31 (1966).

44 Id. at 402.
-45 Ibid.
46 VARMER, op. cit. supra note 36, at 84. Nimmer also suggests that "to prohibit un-

licensed nonprofit performances of musical and nondramatic literary works in such public
places as schools and churches would constitute an undue restriction on the benefits which
should be available to the public." NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 107.31, at 403 (1966).
47 Nimmer writes that "a performance in a private home with only members of the
family and invited guests present clearly is not a 'public' performance." NImMER, COPYRIGHT
§ 107.21, at 400 (1966). At the other extreme, a performance at which no restrictions were
put on the number or class of people which attended would clearly be a "public" performance. No clear line falls between these two poles. In one case where a performance
given at a club was attended only by members and invited guests, it was held that the
performance was not public. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distrib. Corp. v. Wyatt & Maryland
Yacht Club, 21 C.O. Bull. 203 (D.C. Md. 1932). However, cases were held to be public
"where they occurred in clubs which catered primarily to their own members but did not
place effective restrictions on attendance by uninvited members of the general public."
NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 107.21, at 401 (1960), citing Lerner v. Club Wander In, Inc., 174 F.
Supp. 731 (D.C. Mass. 1959); see M. Witmark & Sons v. Tremont Social & Athletic Club,
188 F. Supp. 787 (D.C. Mass. 1960).
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limitation is apparently based on the theory that "it would be, of
course, unthinkable for an infringement to arise every time someone
for the amusement of himself or his friends were to read a book aloud,
or sing a song, or were to participate without an audience in an intimate
play reading group. ' 48 In the case of motion pictures, however, it is
not so apparent that the right to performances should be limited to
those in public.
It is argued that due to the special nature of motion pictures, they
should not be put in the same category as a dramatic performing
right, particularly with respect to the "public performance" limitation.
Motion pictures require broader protection than stage plays. 49 The
"pirating user of a copyrighted stage play takes only the directions
in the form of the plot and dialogue, but makes his own production,
requiring living actors for each infringing performance. No two performances are ever exactly identical, and nonpublic performance is
not a serious injury." 5° The pirating user of a motion picture, however,
appropriates not merely the plot and dialogue, but also "the best and
only production containing the services of artists and actors otherwise
unavailable, but can give unlimited identical performances in any place
for any gathering, which compete with and destroy the value of the
work for the copyright owner and his legitimate exhibition licensees." 51
Representatives of the motion picture industry have long urged an
unlimited exhibition right,52 arguing that such a right is necessary
"to assure control of the copyright owner over the exhibition of films
in clubs, factories, camps, schools, and other such 'semipublic' places
to which the general public is not invited .... ,,53 The evils against

which the motion picture industry has reacted are well illustrated by
the Maryland Yacht Club case. 54 In that case, Judge Coleman followed
the precedent of his opinion in the Tiffany case by holding that the
performance of a motion picture photoplay at a social club, attended
only by members and their guests, was not a public performance within
the meaning of section 1(d) of the Copyright Act. In his opinion, Judge
Coleman stated that he failed "to see that there is any substantial difference between the showing in the present case at the Maryland Yacht
Club and a showing in a private home. We cannot measure the question
48 NimxmR, COPYRIGHT § 107.2 (1966).
49 VARMER,op. cit. supra note 36, at 117.
50 1 SARGOY, STUDY OF COPYRIGHT 225, as quoted in VAR.MER, op. cit. supra note 36, at 111.

51 Ibid.
52 VARMER, op. cit. supra note 36,at 117.
53 Ibid.
54 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distrib. Corp. v. Wyatt & Maryland Yacht Club, 21 0.O. Bull.

203 (D.C. Md. 1932).
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by numbers of persons. The public is not admitted to a social club of
this kind as we understand the term 'public.' "55
The assumption by both Congress and the courts has been that an
important purpose of the copyright law is to permit the copyright owner
to maximize his profits from the exploitation of his work. 56 Because
all the performances of a motion picture are identical, it is reasonable
to assume that one who has attended a performance of a motion picture,
whether that performance be "public" or "private," will normally not
be willing to pay an admission fee to see the motion pictured performed
a second time. It is clear, of course, that the right of the motion picture
copyright owner to the performance of his work should not be unlimited. As noted above, 57 an exception should be made in the case
of performances given for civic, educational, and religious purposes.
However, the rights of the motion picture copyright owner should
58
extend to the private as well as to the public performance of his work.
Distinguishing between public and private performances cannot be
justified on policy grounds, for whether a performance be for profit or
not, in public or in private, it will cause the copyright owner a financial
loss by depriving him of a potential paying audience. 59
55 Id. at 206.
56 The "authorization to grant to individual authors the limited monopoly of copyright
is predicated upon the dual premises that the public benefits from the creative activities
of authors, and that the copyright monopoly is a necessary condition to the full realization
of such creative activities. Implicit in this rationale is the assumption that in the absence
of such public benefit the grant of a copyright monopoly to individuals would be unjustified. This appears to be consonant with the pervading public policy against according
private economic monopolies in the absence of overriding countervailing considerations."
NimmtsR, COPYRIGHT § 3(1) (1966). See also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
57 See note 46 supra.
58 However, Sargoy points out that: "If the question of examination of a copyrighted
film for private scholastic or research purposes were involved, so as to require its necessarily
private projection for such purpose, I would think that this would more appropriately be
left to the doctrine of 'fair use,' than to seriously affect the copyright product of an important copyright industry by an express limitation of exhibition rights to exhibitions
given 'publicly,' 'in public,' or 'for profit' or even as ventured in the Varmer study, to
exhibitions other than in a home for domestic entertainment." SARGOY FOR THE SuBCOMM.
ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG.,

2D SESS., COMMENTS AND VIEWS SuBMITTED TO THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE ON LIMITATIONS ON
PEIFORMING RIGHTS 135 (Comm. Print 1958).

59 Sargoy points out that "the motion-picture industry serves not only the 17,000 or so
theaters which exhibit 35 mm. prints commercially to the public, but a much greater
number on non-theatrical outlets with 16 mm. prints. There are not only hundreds of
thousands of homes which have projection equipment, and license 16 mm. prints from
time to time from distributors in this field, but there are hundreds of thousands of private
or semiprivate establishments, such as schools, colleges, dubs, children's camps, factories,
and other places to which the general public would be denied access, which are potential
exhibition licensees." VAnmRFR, op. cit. supranote 36, at 117 n.146.
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II.

ECONOMIC POLICY AND COPYRIGHT LAW

Protection Against Unauthorized Performances
The justification for copyright is the inducement of artistic activity
by offering economic return. Copyright will perform this function best
if the rights given to the copyright owner are designed, so far as is
compatible with competing social interests, to maximize the return
from the copyrighted work. The value of motion pictures lies in their
performance. The public will pay only to view what is projected on
the screen, but will not pay "to inspect a copyrighted motion picture
print in its container, or while it is being unwound from its spool." 06
A motion picture copyright owner who has no protection against unauthorized performances of his movie does not, therefore, have effective
protection.
The uniqueness of the motion picture industry in the copyright field
is made apparent by its system of releasing a motion picture to the
public through "distribution to thousands of exhibitors by bailment
and rebailment of each of a few hundred copyrighted prints."61 The
most pressing problem for the motion picture industry at the moment
lies in the authentic print which has escaped from the control of the
copyright owner. Recent investigation indicates that thousands of
feature and short subjects, particularly in sixteen millimeter, have
gotten into the hands of bootleggers and are being rented throughout
the United States, as well as internationally. 62 These are not illegally
duped prints, but prints belonging to, and put in circulation by, copyright owners.6 3 They are prints which were authentically made but
which have been lost or stolen from licensees such as the Army and
the Navy, the Veteran's Administration, the Red Cross, and others to
whom they have been entrusted. 64 It is arguable that no copyright
infringement is involved in such piracies, particularly where the rentor
is careful to limit the use of the film to private exhibitions.6 5 But providing the copyright owner with a performance right would make the
60 Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 3 on the Study of the General Revision of the
Copyright Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at
1003-04 (1965) (statement by Copyright Committee on the Motion Picture Association of
America).
61 REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, FOR THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 1ST.
SEss., DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 346 (Comm. Print 1963).

62 Id. at 23.
63 Id. at 346.
04 Id. at 23.
65 Many of the distribution circulars state that these prints are for "home use" only. Id.
at 347.
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unauthorized use of his motion picture by such exhibitors a violation
of the copyright law and would thereby provide the rightful owner
with appropriate remedies. The copyright remedies of injunction,
seizure, and destruction are necessary weapons in the armory of motion
picture copyright owners if they are to protect themselves against such
unauthorized exhibitions, and "are imperative to insure licensing systems and respect for licensing limitations." 66
Pricingand the Necessary Rights to Maximize Profits
Disk-television, as in the case of books and phonograph records,
would probably be distributed through local shops. Moreover, the disks
would most likely be rented rather than sold to the consumer because
of the high capital cost required to produce a disk in relation to its
relatively short period of use. Also, presumably, the consumer would
not want to collect, and therefore purchase, the disks; they are unlike
books-which people collect for reference and because of cultural traditions surrounding their ownership-and unlike phonograph records-which people are more likely to replay.
Motion picture copyright owners might sell their work directly to
rental agencies at its market value. Such sales would be a fair and uncomplicated means of realizing a return on the copyright owner's investment. Economically, however, the copyright owner would better
maximize his profits if he priced his work according to its use. In the
case of motion pictures there is a clear relationship between the utility
of the work to the consumer and its use, i.e., the number of performances he can enjoy. It would be difficult for the copyright owner to
predict the use of his work within a stated interval since this would
depend on the type of consumer involved. For example, the number of
performances would be more unpredictable where the consumer used
the motion picture for commercial purposes than in the case of private
home showings. By pricing his work according to its use, rather than
selling the motion picture at its market value, the copyright owner
could more efficiently exploit the value of his work.6 7
66 Id. at 349.

67 Under the present law, the leasing of disks through local shops would violate the
Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964). where the leases were "used as
an instrument for seeking market control . . .in an attempt to monopolize." United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 346 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). See also United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131
(1947); Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939). Those who presently display motion picture films prefer to rent rather than buy because they only want the films
for a short period of time. In the case of disk-television, however, rental stores would need
the disks for a longer time, perhaps over their effective lives. Under the Sherman Act this
would be treated like any other retailing situation where a firm is not permitted to keep
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If Congress wishes to increase the protection given to a motion
picture copyright owner, it has two alternatives. It may expand the
definition of copy under the statute to include all forms of motion
pictures, and permit the copyright owner to exploit his work by selling
to rental agencies. However, if Congress adopts the traditional assumption that a primary purpose behind the copyright system is to permit
the copyright owner to maximize his profits from his work, it should
choose the second alternative of extending the rights of the motion
picture copyright owner to the performance of his work which would

allow him to discriminate in the price of his work according to its use. 68
control of conditions of resale by retaining "title" to the goods. See Simpson v. Union Oil
Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1963). This would force the motion picture owner to sell the disks to the
local shops. Under the first sale doctrine, the original owner would loose any right to the
performance of the disks. In Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1907), the Court
stated: "In our view the copyright statutes, while protecting the owner of the copyright
in his right to multiply and sell his production, do not create the right to impose, by
notice . . . a limitation at which the book shall be sold at retail by future purchasers, with
whom there is no privity of contract."
48 Price discrimination is not always antithetical to the public interest and may in many
instances be promotive of that interest. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
42-45 (1947).
Arguments which give special treatment to the motion picture copyright owner, as opposed to an author or a composer, can be justified because the performance of a motion
picture is distinguishable from the reading or lending of a book, and the performance of
a phonograph record. Economically, motion pictures have been marketed most successfully,
and therefore almost exclusively, through leasing arrangements. The business of lending
books, however, does not operate on a large or successful scale. Thus, the establishment
of a copyright owner's right to the lending of his book, and with it the establishment of
an additional fee, would "probably tend to drive lending libraries out of business. In the
long run this would result in less net income for both publisher and author." REGISTmR OF
COPYRIGHTS, FOR THE HOUSE CoMirirEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., PRELIMINARY
DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw AND DISCUSSIONS AND COMIENTS ON THE DRAFT 132
(Comm. Print 1964).
The difference between books and motion pictures is in large part a result of the strong
cultural tradition surrounding the ownership of books. People who can afford it buy books
because they want to own them, even though they seldom open them again after once reading them. There is no such tradition surrounding motion pictures. In the case of books
this means that publishers can make a profit selling books, even against the competition of
free loan libraries. Thus, in contrast to the performance of a motion picture, the lending
of a book does not result in a significant decrease in the amount of consumers willing to
pay for the author's work.
Phonograph records are sold directly to the consumer. This is in direct contrast to motion pictures which are distributed almost exclusively through leasing arrangements. The
reason for the difference in the marketing of motion pictures and records is that one performance of a motion picture generally exhausts the market for those who see it. Records,
on the other hand, are played over and over. A record lent to a friend may encourage him
to buy it himself. Record companies encourage exposure of their records on radio broadcasts because it helps to increase their sales and therefore their profits. Thus, as in the
case of books and unlike the case of motion pictures, the phonograph record copyright
owner makes his profits from the sale, and not from the leasing, of his work. Therefore,
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THE PROPOSED BILL

Under the proposed bill for the general revision of the copyright
law, 69 the definition of a motion picture is made in general terms, and

would include disk-television. Section 101 states:
"Motion pictures" are audiovisual works consisting of a series
of related images which, when shown in succession, impart an
impression of motion, together with accompanying sounds,
if any.70
"Audiovisual works" are defined as:
works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or
devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment,
together with any accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of
such as films or tapes, in
the nature of the material objects,
71
which the works are embodied.
The bill would appear to protect the rights of a motion picture
copyright owner. Pursuant to section 106(1), the owner of a copyright
is given the exclusive right to reproduce, or authorize the reproduction
of, the copyrighted work in "copies." The definition of "copies" is
broad and apparently includes any device by which motion pictures
may be performed, including disk-television:
Material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is
fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device. The term "copies" includes the material object,
72
other than a phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed.
Thus, the unauthorized manufacture of motion picture films, videotapes, disks, or other "material objects" is an infringement under the
proposed bill.
the right to the reproduction and sale of his records, and not to their performance, may be
all that is necessary for the copyright owner to maximize his profits from the exploitation
of his work.
69 H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
70 Id. § 101.

71 Ibid. The examples given in the phrase "such as films or tapes" do not add much
to the definition of audiovisual works. They are limited in scope and would not include,
for example, used in disk-television, and therefore might possibly serve to limit the
definition of audiovisual works to only those works embodied in "films or tapes." Thus, it
would appear wiser to delete the phrase entirely.
'72 Id. § 101.
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But perhaps the most dramatic change in copyright law which is
made under the proposed bill is the explicit recognition of a motion
picture copyright owner's exclusive right to the public performance
of his work. Section 106 of the proposed bill provides:
[T]he owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive rights to do
and to authorize any of the following:
(4) in the case of . . . motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly.73
The proposed bill thus properly distinguishes between the right to
"copy" and the right to "perform" motion pictures, thereby avoiding
both the possibility of stretching the definition of "copy" to include
"performance" as was done in the Patterson case, 74 and the artificial
distinction made, if only by implication, in the Mura case. 75
The right to the performance of motion pictures under section 106(4)
is, however, limited to those performances which are made in public. 76
This solution gives both too much and too little protection to the copyright owner. It gives too much in the sense that no performance right,
public or private, should be given if Congress decides that the right of
the motion picture copyright owner to sell his work on the open market
is a sufficient protection for his investment. It gives too little in the sense
that if Congress wishes to provide a right to performance, it should extend the right to all performances to permit the motion picture copyright owner to price according to the use of his work in the case of a
private or home performance as well as in the case where the work is
77
performed publicly.
73 Id. § 106(4).
74 See note 30 supra.
75 See note 32 supra.

76 "To perform or display a work 'publicly' means:
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances is gathered;
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work
to the public by means of any device or process, whether the members of the
public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place
or in separate places and at the same time or at different times."
H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1967).
77 The unlimited right to the performance of motion pictures raises the possibility that
"vast numbers of innocent home viewers will find themselves liable for copyright infringement." Nu rnr, COPYRIGHT § 109.4, at 438 (1966). Thus, where there are unlimited rights
to the performance of motion pictures, an exception should be made which would deny
recovery by the copyright owner against an innocent, private, nonprofit performance. The
home viewer should be liable for copyright infringement only where he had reason to
know, through notice on the disk or the suspicious circumstances under which he acquired
the disk, that his performance was an infringement. Where a home viewer has reason to
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The proposed bill does, however, somewhat limit the exclusive rights
given to the motion picture copyright owner. A new provision states
that "the fair use of a copyrighted work ...is not an infringement of
copyright."7 8 The copyright owner's right to the performance of his
motion picture is further limited where the performance is for certain
educational, 9 religious, 0 or charitable"' purposes.
Finally, the proposal gives the motion picture copyright owner sufficient power to enforce his rights to the performance of his work. The
meaning of "copy" is defined in sufficiently broad terms to include the
disks used in disk-television, and other motion picture devices which
may be invented in the future, thus giving an expanded right of the
copyright owner to "reproduce the copyright work in copies" under
section 106(1). The copyright owner is also given extensive rights to
the distribution of his work. Section 106(3) gives him the right "to
distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership or by rental, lease, or lending. "82
This would seem to be a proper and beneficial extension of the limited
83
right to "vend" provided by section 1(a) of the present Copyright Act.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Because disk-television would normally be performed in private and
not for profit, it is a good example of why both the present Copyright
Act and the proposed bill are inadequate to meet the copyright probknow that his performance is an infringement, he should be subject to all the available
copyright remedies. The problem of the innocent, private, nonprofit infringer does not
come up under the proposed bill, since the rights to performance provided therein are
limited to those performances made in public. See H.R. 2512. 90th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 106(4),
(5) (1967).
78 "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work,
including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the
use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use, the factors to be considered shall
include: (1)the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." Id. at § 107.
For a general discussion of the doctrine of fair use, see NiAma, COPYRIGHT § 145 (1966).
79 Id. §§ 110(1), (2), (4).
80 Id. § 110(), (4).
81 Id. § 110(4), 1ll(a)2.
82 Id. § 106(3).
83 Section 106(3) appears to codify the right of a copyright owner to lease his work,
recognized in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). However, it is possible that the explicit statutory grant of a leasing right could also be interpreted as an exception to the Sherman
Act. See note 67 supra.
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lems caused by the advancing technology in the production of motion
pictures. Under the former, the development of disk-television could
lead to a large scale appropriation of motion picture films since neither
the manufacture nor the performance of disk-television would be held
to be a "copy" of a motion picture film within the meaning of section
1(a). Under the latter, although Congress appears to support the extension of the right of the copyright owner to the performance of his
work, the right is limited to those performances given publicly.
Disk-television has not yet been perfected. There may still be
technological and economic problems to solve before it is successfully
marketed.8 4 However, whether or not disk-television is finally a success,
the inadequacies of the Copyright Act and the proposed revision will
continue to exist. The success of "free" television has suggested that
there is a large demand for "home viewing." And as the technological
and economic problems are solved, and new devices8 5 are produced to
satisfy the "home viewer" market, it will become more important to
provide the motion picture copyright owner with broader rights to
the performance of his work, thereby permitting him to commercially
exploit and receive the economic benefits of a growing "home viewer"
market.
84 Wall Street Journal, March 1, 1966, p. 31, col. 3.

85 R.CA. has recently announced that it is presently developing a home color television
tape recorder player which "would not only record programs off the air, but also would
permit consumers to buy or rent color video tapes of other special program material, just
as they buy original cast albums and other musical recordings ... . Coupled with a small
television camera, it would enable the user to make his home video tape recordings to play
back on the T.V. set ....
" Wall Street Journal, May 4, 1966, p. 6, col. 2.

